Fraser Barnstaple of Kings Chambers kindly spoke on the topic of Mazur at the PNLA & Clarion Solicitors Conference in Leeds on 26 March 2026
Since the conference the Court of Appeal have handed down their judgement in Chartered Institute of Legal Executive (CILEX) & Ors v Mazur & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 369 (31 March 2026)
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2026/369.html
Fraser’s article following on from the conference
Those who attended the PNLA Conference in Leeds on 26 March 2026 will have observed the webinar I provided on Mazur. At that point, the Court of Appeal’s decision was awaited, and the discussion centred around what was argued in the hearing form each party and what problems may arise depending on the decision of the Court of Appeal. Less than a week later on 31st March 2026 the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment and we now have more clarity, but questions still remain.
Background
Charles Russell Speechlys LLP instructed Goldsmith Bowers Solicitors (‘GBS’) to recover unpaid fees from Mrs Mazur. The litigation was handled almost entirely by Mr Middleton, “Head of Commercial Litigation” at GBS. Although employed by a regulated firm, he did not hold a current practising certificate. He was unqualified, yet carried out many if not all of the salient steps in the litigation. Mrs Mazur applied for his replacement with a qualified solicitor.
A solicitor at GBS filed a witness statement confirming that all of Mr Middleton’s work had been done under his supervision. HHJ Simpkiss, hearing the application, held that Mr Middleton was permitted to conduct litigation under that supervision. The Appellants appealed.
Sheldon J overturned HHJ Simpkiss’s decision and analysed the effect of the Legal Services Act 2007. He considered that Mr Middleton was not entitled to conduct litigation merely because he was supervised by a qualified solicitor. He held that there was a distinction between an unauthorised individual assisting or supporting an authorised individual in the conduct of litigation (which is permissible) and an unauthorised individual conducting litigation under supervision (which is not permissible).
CILEX applied and were granted permission to appeal the decision of Sheldon J as an intervening party. Various other parties were given permission to intervene, including APIL, the Law Society, the SRA, the Law Centres Network and the LSB.
The decision of the Court of Appeal
Birss LJ gave the lead judgment and considered there were three main questions for the Court of Appeal to consider:
- Was Sheldon J right to hold that unauthorised persons were “carrying on the conduct of litigation” if they did acts which constituted the conduct of litigation under the supervision of an authorised individual?
- What acts constitute “conducting litigation”?
- Is the working model adopted by Law Centres (whereby a group of authorised individuals delegate the conduct of litigation to unauthorised persons, whilst supervising their work and retaining ultimate responsibility for it) contrary to the LSA 2007?
The unanimous decision of the justices was to allow the appeal, and overturn the decision of Sheldon J. Their decisions on each of the three questions were as follows.
Question 1
It was held that it is not unlawful for an unauthorised person to act for and on behalf of an authorised individual so as to conduct litigation under their supervision, provided the authorised individual puts in place appropriate arrangements for the supervision of and delegation to the unauthorised person.
The delegation of tasks by the authorised individual to the unauthorised person requires proper direction, management supervision and control, the details of which are a matter for the regulators.
Lady Justice Andrews concluded in her judgment that if the reality is that the litigation is not being conducted by the unauthorised person for and on behalf of the authorised individual, they will be committing an offence.
Question 2
Birss LJ gave seven examples, adopted from a list provided by the Law Society, of tasks which he considered would likely not constitute the conduct of litigation. These include: pre-litigation work, giving legal advice in connection with court proceedings, conducting correspondence with the opposing party on behalf of clients, gathering evidence, instructing and liaising with experts and counsel, signing a statement of truth in respect of a statement of case and signing any other document that the CPR permits to be signed by a legal representative, as defined by CPR r2.3.
Question 3
The answer to this question was predicated on the answer to the first issue, as the working model adopted by the Law Centres is governed by the same principles which Birss LJ addressed in answering the first question.
Regulatory Guidance
At the time of writing, only the Law Society has released guidance in response to the decision, which totals around 9 substantive pages.
The requirement that there be proper direction, management supervision and control with the delegation of tasks to non-authorised fee earners is not one which the Court of appeal elaborated on. Instead, the details of the same were held to be a responsibility of the regulatory bodies. The Law Society defined “responsibility” in this context as both formal responsibility for the task itself and responsibility to meet the professional principles set out at section 1(3) LSA 2007.
For what constitutes effective ‘supervision, the Law Society pointed readers of their guidance to the SRA guidance on effective supervision, which is at the time of writing being updated.
It considered that a lot of day to day work does not amount to conducting litigation but that a narrow selection of more would be conducting litigation, such as formal steps in the litigation like issuing proceedings.
Further guidance was also given on practical steps firms can take. Readers of this article are encouraged to rea the Law Society Guidance to consider the tips carefully. In short summary, delegation and supervision must be properly documented, key trigger points in litigation should be the responsibility of an authorised person and firms should ensure the proper training and supervision in respect of all staff.
Guidance from CILEX and the SRA (and potentially others) will likely follow. The industry needs and will hope for a consistent set of guidance across all the regulators.
Practical Implications
Many in the legal industry will welcome this decision and the overturning of the judgment of the High Court.
However, the industry would be wise to heed the warning of Lady Justice Andrews. If the reality is that the litigation is being conducted by an unauthorised person other than for and on behalf of an authorised person, they will be committing an offence. Lady Justice Andrews no doubt refers here to the effect of the LSA 2007, s14.
At present, there is no clear definition of “conduct of litigation”. The Court of Appeal considered they had not been adequately equipped by the arguments to provide a definition. Aside from the specific examples provided of acts which would not constitute the conduct of litigation, the meaning appears to be very much open to interpretation.
If there are any breaches of the LSA 2007 even in light of the aforementioned, it is unlikely that this would or should affect the recoverability of costs inter partes although parties would need to rely on the existing authorities which pre-date Mazur when arguing the point, as the Court of Appeal’s decision in Mazur does not address the issue. The Court of Appeal in Garbutt v Edwards [2005] EWCA Civ 1206 held that a breach of the solicitors’ code of conduct was a regulatory issue and did not affect costs recovery inter partes. Indeed, the unofficial stance of the Costs Judges in the Senior Courts Costs Office appears to be that Mazur-related arguments are a regulatory issue- not a costs issue. Still, some decisions at County Court level have wielded Mazur to disallow costs claimed inter partes. Perhaps that turmoil may continue, albeit at a less frequent rate.
In the preparation of this article, I have been asked whether, in the event an offence is committed under the LSA 2007, there would be a duty on litigators to contact the police. The short answer is no, as there is not generally an obligation on an individual to report a crime to the police. In respect of whether one’s respective regulator should be contacted, it would very much depend on the obligations of the professional and the nature of the breach. Litigators should familiarise themselves with their reporting/self-reporting obligations in the event of a breach of the LSA 2007.
14 April 2026
Fraser Barnstaple | Kings Chambers | fbarnstaple@kingschambers.com
Editorial note: the first version of this article was published by LexisNexis. An updated and amended version has been republished here with the consent of LexisNexis for PNLA members. To see the original article, please use the following link:
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